On the Nature of Things - Lucretius

Lucretius tells us that he has set about on an inquiry, not just into "celestial affairs", but also into the soul and the nature of the human mind, and of what these consist. By and large, we must admit, he has been successful. Though much of the scientific understandings have become outmoded (it has, of course, been two thousand years) much of the poet/philosopher's insights prefigure much of modern-day understanding. As the plaudits for this work span millennia, it would serve scant purpose to add another drop to the bucket. Rather than pursue much of a review here, I wanted to focus on a certain line of questioning this work elicited.

Lucretius speaks of, what we would translate, as atoms. That such an insight was available to this man is, in and of itself, a colossal triumph (though he was not the first). Atoms, he writes, make up all things and anything that can act or be acted upon must be composed of atoms; there is nothing else in all of infinite existence. It is the random movement of atoms - the departure from the set path, also known as the clinamen - that sets the universe into the motion we recognize. Building off this position, Lucretius develops a philosophy predicated on the tangibility of existence. Of particular interest is how the transition from inanimate matter and the departure of the clinamen is transformed into that which is intelligible in the world around us. This passage, and the attendant emergent complexity of the world, could perhaps be better understood if Lucretius' ontology was operationalized in practical use.

Yet, we cannot help but wonder to what extent such insights meaningfully speak to the modern day. Can philosophy and knowledge transcend such vast expanses of time? Can insights gleaned by classical philosophers and scientists really speak meaningfully about the world we inhabit? This is not meant as some sort-of rhetorical slight-of-hand. While it may be obvious that when, say Lucretius, or Aristotle or Kant, writes about nature, that they will not have the same exact thing in mind, to what extent can we speak generically as though they were even discussing the same concept? If knowledge is - and some might argue that it must be - a contextualized phenomena, what basis is there to say that people across time and space are speaking of the same entities or concepts at all? If the world and the people within it are all of one piece, as Lucretius argues, certainly the situatedness of any knower is central to knowledge creation and communication. Can we meaningfully say that ideas are eternal? What is the basis for such a claim?